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BANKRUPTCY—EXEMPTIONS:
WHEN AN INTERESTED PARTY MUST OBJECT,
AND EXEMPTING PROPERTY WITH THE INTENTION
OF RETAINING POSSESSION
Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010)
ABSTRACT
In Schwab v. Reilly, the United States Supreme Court partially
frustrated the primary purpose of bankruptcy by making it more difficult for
the debtor to exempt property itself, rather than a liquidated interest in that
property. The Supreme Court held that when a debtor lists the value of the
property the debtor wishes to exempt as equal to the fair market value of the
property as listed on the debtor’s schedules, the debtor has not effectively
exempted the property itself, but rather only an interest in the property up to
the value the debtor has listed on his or her schedule. The debtor must list
the value of the exemptible property as “100% of FMV” or use similar
language in order to put the trustee on notice the debtor intends to keep the
property. Because this method is not standard practice, there will be several
rather large problems in the interim until this practice becomes more wellknown.
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I.

FACTS

Nadejda Reilly filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy after the catering business she owned failed.1 In support of her petition, Reilly filed a list of her
assets on a Schedule B and a list of the property she wished to exempt from
the bankruptcy estate on a Schedule C.2 On Schedule B, Reilly listed assets
she described as “business equipment,” which she valued at $10,718.3 The
list of assets included various items of kitchen and cooking equipment,

1. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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which Reilly used in the operation of her business, and the estimated values
of each item.4
Schedule C contained the various exemptions Reilly claimed for her
property.5 Among the exemptions were two separate claims of exemption
in the kitchen and cooking equipment in her attached list to Schedule B.6
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6), Reilly claimed a “tools of the trade”
exemption permitting her to exempt an “aggregate interest, not to exceed
$1850 in value, in any implements, professional books, or tools, of [the]
trade.”7 Reilly claimed the full “tools of the trade” exemption, $1850, in
the items listed as “business equipment” on her schedules.8 She then
claimed the rest of the value of her equipment, $8868, as a “wildcard
exemption” pursuant to § 522(d)(5).9 The wildcard exemption allows the
debtor to exempt “interest in any property,” up to $10,225 in value.10
Prior to the meeting of the creditors, William Schwab, the trustee
appointed to Reilly’s case, inquired with an auctioneer as to the value of the
kitchen and cooking equipment.11 The auctioneer informed Schwab the
equipment may have been worth as much as $17,000, much more than
Reilly’s estimate of the value of the equipment.12 At the meeting of the
creditors, held on June 22, 2005, Schwab informed Reilly he intended to
auction the equipment to retrieve any excess value in it beyond her
exemptions.13 Reilly responded she would rather dismiss her bankruptcy
case than lose her cooking equipment.14 Reilly subsequently moved to
dismiss her bankruptcy petition on June 29, 2005.15 Schwab did not object
to Reilly’s exemptions, and, before the court ruled on Reilly’s motion to
dismiss, filed a motion to sell the equipment on August 10, 2005.16 Reilly
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006). Reilly filed her bankruptcy petition in 2005.
Brief for Respondent at 5, Schwab, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 08-538). The amount which can be
exempted under this statute was subsequently adjusted in 2007 and again in 2010 to the current
level of $2175. See 11 U.S.C. § 104 (Supp. 2009).
8. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657.
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). This value has also been adjusted pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 104. See Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2657 n.1.
11. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Schwab, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 08-538).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brief for Respondent, supra note 7, at 11. The equipment held sentimental value for the
debtor because it had been purchased for her by her parents. Id. at 11-12. In addition, the debtor
stated she wished to continue with her catering business post-bankruptcy, which would be
impossible without the equipment. Id. at 12.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 16.
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then claimed because she equated the value of the exemption on Schedule C
to the value of the equipment listed on Schedule B, she put the trustee on
notice that she intended to exempt the equipment itself, not just the value
listed on Schedule C.17 She argued because no party in interest objected to
her exemption within thirty days, as required by Rule 4003(b) of the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the equipment became fully
exempt regardless of its value.18 Schwab argued he was not required to
object because the amounts listed were clearly within statutory limits and
the exemption of her interest at those values was proper.19 The bankruptcy
court denied Schwab’s motion to sell the equipment and also denied
Reilly’s motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case.20 Schwab appealed to the
district court, which rejected his claims, and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Bankruptcy has a long and complex history and touches nearly every
corner of society.22 The Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, contained in Article 1, section 8, gives Congress the power to create
“uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.”23 James Madison wrote in 1788, regarding the Bankruptcy Clause,
that “bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of
commerce . . . that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into
question.”24 First, this section briefly discusses the history of bankruptcy
and its modern evolution.25 Then, it considers the subject of modern bankruptcy discharge and its purposes.26 Finally, this section addresses exemptions and objecting to exemptions.27

17. Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2658 (2010).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2659.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1991).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
24. The FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part II.B.1.
27. See infra Part II.B.2.
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A. THE HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY: FROM BRUTAL ENDS TO
FRESH STARTS
The concept and focus of bankruptcy has changed dramatically since
its most primitive forms.28 Reviewing bankruptcy’s history is key to understanding how modern bankruptcy protections work and how those protections shield debtors.29 This section first describes early forms of bankruptcy and attitudes toward debtors.30 Next, this section discusses early
English bankruptcy law as the foundation for American bankruptcy law,
including the concept of discharge.31 Finally, this section examines the
evolution of both American law since the Constitution and the concept of
discharge.32
1.

Ancient Bankruptcy

Historically, bankruptcy was a “ghastly evil,” an unthinkable slight in
early commerce.33 Bankruptcy laws were severe and entirely unconcerned
with the welfare of the debtor.34 In early Rome, the “Twelve Tables of
Roman Law” allowed creditors to enslave a debtor if the debtor defaulted,
or, if the debtor had many creditors, to divide the debtor’s body into pieces
and distribute to the creditors in proportion to the amount owed each of
them.35 Medieval Europe permitted a debtor to avoid imprisonment for
bankruptcy if the debtor allowed all of the debtor’s possessions to be taken
by the creditors “amidst shame.”36 “Shame” meant very public sanctions
upon the debtor, which took various humiliating and almost absurd forms.37
For example, in Italy, a debtor was made to walk nude into the public
square and strike his backside against “The Rock of Shame” three times
while crying “I declare bankruptcy.”38 French bankrupts, upon defaulting,
were made to wear the “bonnet vert,” a green cap announcing, to the
28. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 5 (1995).
29. See generally id. (suggesting Congress should seriously consider the long history of
bankruptcy law before taking radical action to reform the bankruptcy system).
30. See infra Part II.A.1.
31. See infra Part II.A.2.
32. See infra Part II.A.3.
33. James Q. Whitman, The Moral Menace of Roman Law and the Making of Commerce:
Some Dutch Evidence, 105 YALE L.J. 1841, 1871 (1996).
34. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor—and a Modest Proposal
to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 810 (1983).
35. Id. at 809-10; see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *472.
36. Whitman, supra note 33, at 1873.
37. Id.
38. Id. Many times, the debtor was also banished after this humiliating ceremony. Id. at
1874.
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debtor’s humiliation, that the debtor had declared bankruptcy.39 As a
leading bankruptcy scholar stated, “History’s annals are replete with tales of
draconian treatment of debtors.”40
2.

Early English Law: Laying the Foundations of Discharge

Similar to medieval and ancient laws of bankruptcy, early English
bankruptcy law was singularly concerned with the rights of the creditor.41
“Protecting creditors protected commerce, and commerce was king.”42
Early English bankruptcy laws, the first of which was enacted in 1542, were
created exclusively for the benefit of creditors.43 The first bankruptcy laws
were enacted to keep creditors from fighting over assets, not to provide
rights to the debtor.44 The “[r]elief was not for debtors, but from debtors.”45
Creditors forced bankruptcy upon debtors in an entirely involuntary
proceeding.46 Debtors were considered “offenders,” and the laws enacted
in 1542 and 1570 still threatened the imprisonment of debtors.47 The
foundation of modern liquidation proceedings could be seen in this process,
though.48 The debtor’s assets were sold and distributed pro rata to the
creditors in a similar fashion to a liquidation case today.49 Even after this
distribution, there was no discharge of the debt.50 “[C]reditors were free
after bankruptcy to continue to pursue individual collection remedies
against the debtor.”51 The laws of 1542 and 1570 would continue to be the
standard for nearly 150 years, with changes only strengthening the ability of
creditors to collect.52
The origins of the discharge of debt in bankruptcy came in 1705, when
England passed a statute allowing debtors a discharge if they were cooperative in the distribution of their assets.53 This statute was passed not out
of good will to the debtor, but in an effort to increase the amounts collected
and the ease of collection from the debtor in bankruptcy by encouraging
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Tabb, supra note 22, at 327.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Tabb, supra note 28, at 8.
Id.
Tabb, supra note 22, at 329.
Tabb, supra note 28, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tabb, supra note 22, at 331-32.
Id. at 333.
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debtors to refrain from concealing assets and engaging in other fraud in
order to hinder their creditors.54 Under the Statute of 4 Anne, honest but
unfortunate debtors who cooperated in the administration of their estate
could receive a discharge of their debts if the commissioners, a position
similar to that of the modern trustee, certified the debtor had conformed to
the requirements of the bankruptcy proceeding.55 The power of the commissioner to grant a discharge was mitigated the very next year by passage
of an act requiring creditors’ consent to grant the debtor discharge.56 The
requirement of creditors’ consent seriously hampered the debtor’s ability to
obtain a discharge.57
The 1705 acts also created the precursors to the modern concept of the
exemption.58 The debtor was allowed to keep necessary clothing for his
family.59 In addition, the debtor was granted an allowance out of the estate,
which could not exceed 200 pounds and was contingent on the creditors
receiving a certain percentage of the estate after administrative costs.60
3.

Bankruptcy in America: The Debtor Sees Relief

It is quite likely the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had the British
bankruptcy system in mind when formulating the Bankruptcy Clause.61
James Madison believed bankruptcy was such an important force in commerce that it should be addressed on a national level.62 Congress sparsely
used the Bankruptcy Clause and never successfully created a national bankruptcy system in the first hundred years of the nation’s existence,63 despite
being granted the incredibly broad power to pass uniform laws concerning
bankruptcy.64
Finally, in 1898, a permanent Bankruptcy Act was passed.65 This Act
provided the basis for modern American thought about bankruptcy.66 Most
significantly, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 formed a marked change in

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
(1976).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Tabb, supra note 28, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 227
Id.
Id.
Tabb, supra note 22, at 326.
Tabb, supra note 28, at 13.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Id. at 23.
Tabb, supra note 22, at 364.
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attitude toward discharge of debt.67 The Act specifically and unequivocally
rejected the notion that discharge is conditioned on the assent of creditors.68
Discharge was automatically granted unless the debtor acted dishonestly in
his or her bankruptcy.69 Creditors were not required to collect a certain
amount before the debtor could obtain a discharge.70 As the committee
report for the bill noted, “The granting or withholding of [discharge] is dependent upon the honesty of the man, not upon the value of his estate.”71
Unless the debtor committed certain dishonest infractions prohibited in the
Act, the debtor would obtain a discharge.72
Exemption laws, which were originally used in the eighteenth century
as an incentive for debtors to cooperate in the bankruptcy,73 had also come
full circle through a slow evolution of humanitarian laws enacted in the individual states.74 The most important evolution, though, was the substance
of the exemption laws.75 First, there were exemptions for clothes.76 Next
came exemptions for tools of the trade and homesteads, and, finally, exemptions for household items.77 These exemptions held a dual purpose that
still rings true today: helping the debtor emerge as a productive member of
society and protecting the debtor and his family from abject poverty.78
It is vitally important to see the distinction between the purpose of
bankruptcy law historically and the purpose of bankruptcy in the United
States today. As Professor Seligson wrote:
[T]he attitude towards and the treatment of delinquent debtors
have been subjected to significant changes since the days of torture
and slavery under the Roman law and the days of pillory and
imprisonment under English law. The enlightened approach of
today is to give the unfortunate but honest debtor an opportunity to

67. Id. at 363.
68. Id. at 364.
69. Id. According to the committee report, a debtor acts dishonestly “by committing certain
acts forbidden in the bill.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 55-65, at 43 (1897)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 55-65, at 43 (1897)).
72. Id. at 366.
73. Id. at 341.
74. William J. Woodward, Jr., Exemption, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 335, 337-38 (1982).
75. Id. at 338.
76. Countryman, supra note 58, at 228.
77. Woodward, supra note 74, at 337-38.
78. Id. at 337.
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free himself from the burden of debt. The Bankruptcy Act treats
the delinquent debtor with compassionate regard.79
American law’s sharp move from a pro-creditor to a pro-debtor stance
signals the attitude that the United States has toward the bankrupt.80
Excessive debt is no longer a crime, but an unfortunate turn of events.81
The bankrupt is not in need of punishment, but in need of revival.82
B. A FRESH START: CURRENT BANKRUPTCY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
The two most important concepts to a debtor’s fresh start in American
bankruptcy law are the concepts of discharge and exemption. This section
considers these issues in turn. First, this section discusses discharge and
objections to discharge. Next, this section focuses on exemptions and
objections to exemptions.
1.

Discharge: A Fresh Start

Discharge is the most basic and overarching concept of American
bankruptcy and is what provides the debtor with a new financial life, more
commonly known as a “fresh start.”83 In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, § 727(a)
instructs that the court “shall” grant discharge to the debtor,84 and § 524(a)
describes how discharge is achieved.85
First, § 524(a)(1) voids any judgment that was obtained against the
debtor in the determination of his debts prior to filing bankruptcy.86 Therefore, if a creditor obtained a judgment against the debtor in a state court, the
minute the debtor’s discharge is granted, that judgment would have no
effect against the debtor personally.87 The creditor would have no right to
levy upon any of the debtor’s property or to pursue the debtor any further in
collection of the judgment.88
79. Charles Seligson, Major Problems for Consideration by the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 73, 78 (1971).
80. Tabb, supra note 22, at 370.
81. Id. at 364-65.
82. Id.
83. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1.01[1], at 1-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2010).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006).
85. Id. § 524(a).
86. Id. § 524(a)(1). Note the statute voids any personal liability of the debtor for judgments
against the debtor. Judgments against the property of the debtor are not affected by the discharge.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.02[1], at 524-20 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2010).
87. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86.
88. Id.
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Second, § 524(a)(2) to (3) enjoins creditors from pursuing or continuing to pursue prosecution of any debt owed to them by the debtor.89 This
means the creditor cannot begin any action, whether it be a lawsuit or any
other action, to collect the debt from the debtor.90 Because the creditors
cannot enforce a judgment against the debtor and cannot prosecute or continue to prosecute any debts after the discharge, the bankruptcy proceeding
is the creditor’s only remedy.91 Any violation of these sections is considered contempt of court.92
Before 1978, although the bankruptcy court determined whether the
debtor had the right to discharge, the effects of that discharge were left up
to the forum state.93 Debtors during this period faced multiple state
lawsuits from creditors after receiving a discharge from the bankruptcy
court.94 At that time, discharge was not an automatic injunction to state
court actions, but rather an affirmative defense to the action.95 The debtor,
who had just lost all but the bare essentials, paid a filing fee, paid his or her
attorney’s fee, and had no money left to defend the lawsuits.96 Thus, the
creditors would receive default judgments against the debtor and would
levy on the property the debtor had claimed as exempt.97 The modern
system enjoining the prosecution or enforcement of these lawsuits serves to
protect the debtor from ongoing prosecution of discharged debts.98
The only condition upon the debtor’s discharge is that the debtor does
not violate any of the exceptions detailed in § 727.99 Most of these
exceptions involve fraud, usually an attempt by the debtor to conceal assets
or debt so the creditors receive fewer assets.100 To deny the debtor discharge based on a § 727 exception, a party in interest, either the trustee or a
creditor, may object to the discharge and state the grounds for denial of the
discharge.101 This burden reflects the ultimate principle behind modern

89. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)-(3).
90. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 524.02[2][a], at 524-21.
91. Id. at 524-22.
92. Id.
93. Hearing on S.J. Res. 100 Before the Subcomm. on Bankr. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 22 (1968) [hereinafter Hearing on S.J. Res. 100].
94. Id.
95. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 83, ¶ 20.01[2][d], at 20-10.
96. Hearing on S.J. Res. 100, supra note 93, at 22.
97. Id.
98. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 524.02[2][a], at 524-21.
99. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2006).
100. See id. § 727(a)(1)-(12) (describing exceptions that do not grant discharge to a debtor
due to fraud).
101. Id. § 727(c)(1)-(2).
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discharge: that an honest debtor will receive his discharge unless a party in
interest proves the debtor has acted dishonestly.102
2.

Exemptions: Something upon Which to Build

At the outset of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all of the debtor’s assets
become property of the estate.103 Some of the property in the estate may
then be reclaimed by the debtor as exempt.104 Essentially, the debtor may
set aside some property and keep it from the claims of creditors.105
The purpose of exemptions is undoubtedly clear: “to provide [the
debtor] with the basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on
all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a
public charge.”106 In other words, the debtor is allowed to retain enough
possessions to begin life anew.107 Since 1978, federal bankruptcy law has
allowed the individual states to choose between allowing the debtor to use
the federal exemptions or to opt-out and only allow the debtor to use the
exemptions provided for in state law.108 The exemptions the debtor can
take and how much property he or she can exempt vary significantly from
state to state.109 Because the way a debtor exempts property in bankruptcy
is unaffected by the substance of the exemptions, whether supplied by state
or federal law, Schwab v. Reilly has a universal effect on the process of
exemption.110
Under § 522(1), a debtor must file a list of property the debtor claims
as exempt.111 Rule 4003(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
requires the debtor file this list as part of his or her schedule of assets
required by Rule 1007(b)(1)(A).112 Official Form 6 contains a Schedule C,
on which the debtor is required to list the property he or she is claiming as
exempt.113 Schedule C instructs the debtor to: describe the property,
specify the law “authorizing” the exemption, and give the value of the
exemption along with the current market value of the property without

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Tabb, supra note 22, at 365-66.
Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2010).
Id.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.01, at 522-14.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 126 (1978).
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (2010).
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.02[2], at 522-17.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(a).
Id.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
FED. R. BANKR. P. form 6.
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deduction for the exemption.114 In other words, the debtor must show the
propriety of the exemption by stating which law authorizes it and how the
exemption fits within the strictures of that law both categorically and
monetarily.115
There are several different types of exemptions available to the debtor
under § 522, including the general exemption, also known as the “wild
card” exemption, and the “implements of trade” exemption.116 In 2004, the
general exemption, as codified in § 522(d)(5), allowed for the exemption of
the debtor’s interest up to $975 of any of his or her property.117 In addition,
the general exemption allowed the debtor to add to its limit any unused
portion of the homestead exemption up to $9250.118 Thus, the maximum
value of the “wild card” exemption was $10,225.119 The wild card exemption “may be applied to any property that is property of the estate . . . .”120
The primary purpose of this exemption is to allow the debtor greater
flexibility in the use of other exemptions, as well as preventing discrimination against nonhomeowners by allowing them to use a large portion of the
homestead exemption for personal property.121
The “implements of trade” exemption allows the debtor to exempt his
or her interest in “implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of
the debtor . . . .”122 The maximum interest exemptible was limited to $1850
in 2004.123 The reason for this exemption is quite clear: “to help preserve
the debtor’s means of earning a living.”124
According to § 522(l), after the debtor has listed exemptions on Schedule C, the property is exempt unless a party in interest timely objects.125
Timeliness of the objection is determined by Rule 4003(b), which states
objections made to a claim of exemption must be made within thirty days
after the meeting of the creditors.126 This limitation is strictly enforced.127
In Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz,128 the debtor listed a cause of action on a
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.05[1], at 522-30.
11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(1)-(12) (West Supp. 2010).
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2006). This amount has been adjusted. See supra note 9.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (Supp. IV 2004).
Id.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.09[5], at 522-68.
Id. at 522-67.
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6).
Id. (Supp. IV 2004).
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.09[6], at 522-68.
11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
Id.
503 U.S. 638 (1992).
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Schedule B list of assets and noted the value of the claim was “unknown.”129 She then listed the proceeds from the cause of action as
exempt.130 The trustee took no action to object to the claim of exemption,
and when the debtor received a significant recovery—much higher than the
trustee had anticipated—the trustee sought to recover those funds for the
estate.131 In Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, despite the fact the
lawsuit was not a proper exemption, the trustee’s failure to object in a
timely fashion, pursuant to section 522(l) and Rule 4003(b), barred him
from challenging the validity of the exemption.132 The debtor and the
trustee agreed the debtor was only entitled to a small amount of the proceeds from the lawsuit, but because the debtor exempted on her schedules
all of the proceeds and the trustee failed to object, all of the proceeds
became exempt.133
III. ANALYSIS
In Schwab v. Reilly, Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion to
which Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Alito and Sotomayor joined.134
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, whereby Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Breyer joined.135 In reversing the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, the majority held Schwab did not have an obligation to object to a
claimed exemption because the exemption was proper on its face and,
therefore, his motion to sell Reilly’s equipment to recover excess value
should have been granted.136 The dissent argued that because Reilly indicated she intended to exempt the property itself, rather than just an interest
in the property, Schwab had an obligation to object and, therefore, his
motion to sell should have been denied.137
A. THE MAJORITY
First, the Court addressed whether an interested party has an obligation
to object under § 522(l) when the code specifies that the debtor is exempting an interest up to a certain amount and the debtor’s valuation of the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Taylor, 503 U.S. at 640.
Id.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 641-42.
Id.
Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652, 2656 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 2661.
Id. at 2672 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

680

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86:667

exemption is clearly within those limits.138 Next, the Court addressed the
applicability of Taylor and whether it dictated the trustee had an obligation
to object to the exemption.139 Finally, the Court discussed foreseeable
ramifications with adopting Reilly’s view and explained how a debtor may
exempt property itself, rather than an interest in that property.140
1.

Whether the Interested Party Must Object

The majority began its analysis by rejecting the debtor’s contention that
the controlling language in § 522(l) was the provision stating “property
claimed as exempt on [such list] is exempt” unless a party objects.141 The
Court instead pointed to the language of the same subsection, stating the
target of the objection must be the “list of property that the debtor claims as
exempt under subsection (b).”142 The Court noted the categories of exemptions Reilly invoked defined the property the debtor may exempt as an
“interest” up to a certain dollar amount, not the assets themselves.143 The
Court held Reilly’s definition of “property” was grounded in language from
Schedule C and dictionary definitions, which were superseded by the Code
when they differed.144 Because Reilly only exempted $10,718 of her
interest in her property, not the property itself, Schwab was entitled to sell
the property to recover any excess value.145
While Reilly argued she put Schwab on notice that she intended to
exempt the property itself by equating the exemption value to the market
value,146 the Court decided whether the debtor intended to exempt the
property itself was not a consideration the trustee must take into account.147
The Court concluded Schwab was entitled to evaluate the propriety of the
exemption based on three considerations: first, the description of the equipment, to ensure it qualified as property the exemption contemplated;
second, the specific Code provisions “governing” each exemption; third, the
listed value of the claimed exemption.148 The market valuation of the
property is there purely for the purpose of helping the trustee determine
whether there may be excess value in property beyond what the exemptions
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 2661-62.
Id. at 2665-67.
Id. at 2667-68.
Id. at 2661.
Id.
Id. at 2661-62.
Id. at 2662.
See id. (implying Schwab was entitled to sell the property to recover any excess value).
Id. at 2661.
Id. at 2666.
Id. at 2663.
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allow.149 Thus, because the value exempted and the type of property
exempted was within the statutory guidelines in the exemption invoked,
there was nothing warranting an objection.150 The fact that the value of the
exemption was equated to the market value of the property on Schedule C
had no effect.151
2.

Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz

The Court held the court of appeals erred in determining Taylor was
applicable to Schwab.152 The Court explained, “Taylor does not rest on
what the debtor ‘meant’ to exempt.” Instead, Taylor applies to the face of
the claim of the exemption.153 In Taylor, the debtor listed the value of a
lawsuit as “unknown” when she claimed it as an exemption.154 Because an
unknown value is not plainly within the limits of the exemption, the trustee
had an obligation to object.155 In other words, the Taylor test specifies that
if the value claimed as exempt is not plainly within statutory limits, the
party in interest has an obligation to object.156
The Court explicitly rejected the court of appeals’ reading of Taylor,
which focused on the “unstated premise” that “a debtor who exempts the
entire reported value of an asset is claiming the ‘full amount,’ whatever it
158
turns out to be.”157 The Court gave two reasons for rejecting this premise.
First, it explained this would require the Court to expand the definition of
“property claimed as exempt” beyond an interest in the property.159
Second, the Court explained the “universe of information” a party in
interest must look to when determining the propriety of an exemption
would expand because the party would have to look to inferences on the
debtor’s bankruptcy forms rather than the facial validity of the exemptions
themselves.160 Thus, the Court took Reilly’s claim of exemption at face
value, that she exempted a $10,718 interest in her property rather than a
certain item of property, and ruled Taylor inapplicable.161
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The Ramifications

Reilly argued her reading of § 522(1) was fundamental to the “goal of
giving debtors a fresh start” and preventing interested parties from “sleeping on their rights.”162 The Court disagreed, concluding Reilly’s approach
“threatens to convert a fresh start into a free pass.”163 The Court reasoned
that Congress weighed the negative effect exemption limits have on debtors
with the negative effect exemptions have on creditors.164 The Court then
refused to alter this balance by adopting Reilly’s approach.165
The Court proposed how a debtor may exempt the asset itself if the
debtor so desires.166 The Court suggested doing so “in a manner that makes
the scope of the exemption clear.”167 For example, the Court recommended
the debtor, instead of giving a value for the exemption, write “full fair
market value (FMV)” or “100% of FMV.”168 This demarcation, the Court
said, would require the trustee to object to recover any value above the
statutory limit for the estate.169 If the trustee failed to object, the full value
of the asset would be exempted.170
B. THE DISSENT
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg, argued Reilly made it clear
she intended to exempt the property itself, not an interest up to $10,718 in
171
the property. The dissent further argued that because no party in interest
objected, the property should have been excluded from the estate as
exempt.172 The dissent rejected the Court’s holding that the trustee did not
have to object to the debtor’s valuation of her exemption.173 The dissent
stressed the importance of the current-market valuation of the exempt
property and argued the majority stripped the current-market valuation of
its usefulness.174 Justice Ginsburg contended the better holding would have
been that a debtor who lists a market value below the monetary cap for the
exemption and lists an identical amount as the claimed exemption has
162.
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signaled he or she intends to keep the property itself.175 An item with a
market valuation above the cap signals to the trustee the debtor recognizes
he or she cannot shield the property from sale but intends to claim an
exemption out of the proceeds.176 If the trustee fails to file a timely
objection, the right to keep the property should be secured to the debtor.177
Essentially, the dissent held that market valuation is key to determining the
propriety of the exemption, and thus Rule 4003(b) should be read to require
the party in interest to object to a market valuation the party believes is not
proper.178
The dissent then asserted that requiring objections to market valuation
or exempted property facilitates the primary purpose of the exemptions:
giving the debtor a fresh start.179 Most notably, the objection deadline
produces finality in the exemption procedure.180 The debtor may plan for
the future with the “knowledge that the possessions she has exempted in
their entirety are hers to keep.”181 Under the majority’s holding, the dissent
noted, a trustee may at any time during the bankruptcy case, until discharge,
gain another opinion on the value of the property, then auction off the
property and simply hand the debtor a check for the amount listed on the
schedule.182 This, the dissent opined, severely hampers the debtor’s ability
to plan for the future, and thus harms the fresh start.183
The dissent then addressed three concerns the majority had with
reading Rule 4003(b) to require objection to market valuation.184 First, the
Court expressed concern that requiring this objection would greatly increase
administrative costs by increasing the number of objections the trustee must
make.185 The dissent disagreed, stating the trustee already had the responsibility of determining market valuation in order to determine whether there
was excess value in the property, and applying Rule 4003(b) simply puts a
deadline on that process.186 The dissent pointed out if the trustee needed
more than thirty days to assess the market value, the trustee had many options available to extend the deadline.187 A trustee may obtain an extension
175.
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from the bankruptcy court for cause or may postpone the conclusion of the
meeting of the creditors.188 Thus, trustees have “ample mechanisms at their
disposal to gain the time and information they need to lodge objections to
valuation.”189
Secondly, the dissent disputed the majority’s contention the trustee
would lack fair notice of the need to object.190 The dissent stated if a debtor
listed identical values for the exemption and the market value, the debtor
would have on the face of the schedule “reclaimed the entire asset just as
surely as if she had recorded ‘100% of [market value].’”191 Justice
Ginsburg also stated a debtor completing a Schedule C would think it
nonsensical to enter “FMV” when the schedule tells the debtor to enter the
dollar value.192 There would be no way for pro se debtors to know they
must ignore the instructions and input the correct warning flags.193
Finally, the dissent disputed the majority’s contention that requiring
objections would give debtors the incentive to undervalue their assets in
hopes the trustee would fail to object.194 As the dissent noted, there are
many procedural safeguards to protect against falsifying or lying about
information on the schedules, including an oath which makes the debtor
liable for perjury and the possibility of denial of discharge under § 727.195
In addition, the objection procedure itself is designed to be a safeguard
against undervaluation, and thus the dissent deemed the majority’s fears
irrational.196 Therefore, the dissent would have upheld the Third Circuit’s
ruling that the property was exempt.197
IV. IMPACT
The Court based its holding that the trustee does not need to object to
an exemption pursuant to Rule 4003(b) when the value of the exemption
and the market value of the property are listed as equal values, based on the
conclusion that when a value is listed for an exemption, it can only
represent a monetary interest, not a possessory interest.198 This is contrary
to the spirit of the bankruptcy code, the history of our bankruptcy laws, and
188.
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the plain purpose of the exemptions themselves. Modern American
bankruptcy law has overtly stated a social, rather than a financial, purpose.199 Bankruptcy’s primary goal is revitalization of the debtor through
discharge, rather than repayment of the creditors.200 Each exemption has a
particular purpose. For instance, the tools of the trade exemption seeks to
allow the debtor to keep property which is useful for the debtor’s particular
line of work.201 Allowing the debtor to keep this property aids the debtor in
continuing in his or her line of work, therefore becoming a productive
member of society who can pay his or her debts again.202 By the Court’s
formulation, the trustee always has the right to auction the property because
the debtor is only entitled to the amount of money the property represents,
not the property itself.203 But the money is less useful to the debtor than the
tools themselves.204 Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that an “interest”
only refers to a monetary interest, not a possessory interest, is counterintuitive to the purpose of the exemptions.
The holding of Schwab v. Reilly has a potentially far-reaching impact
because the standard practice when completing Schedule C is to list identical values of the exemption and the market value if the debtor intends to
exempt the property itself.205 Certainly, a debtor thinks more about keeping
his or her property rather than keeping the money the property is worth. As
evidence of this, a popular “how to” book on filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy
tells its readers to focus on the property they “really want to keep.”206
Because debtors almost always have property they “really want to keep,”
the holding of Schwab v. Reilly will affect almost every Chapter 7 filing.
First, when the debtor wants to exempt the property itself, he or she
must list either “100% of fair market value” or “full fair market value” in
the “value of the exemption” column of Schedule C.207 The consequences
if the debtor fails to do so could be disastrous, particularly if the debtor is
exempting assets that may change in value. A good example of this is if the
debtor decides to use the wildcard exemption and fill up the homestead
exemption, using § 522(d)(5), by exempting $10,000 in stock the debtor
199. Tabb, supra note 22, at 364-65.
200. Id. at 365.
201. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.09[6], at 522-68.
202. Id.
203. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2661-62.
204. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 6087-88 (1977).
205. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 86, ¶ 522.05[2][c], at 522-37. “Normally, if a
debtor lists an asset as having a particular value in the schedules and then exempts that value, the
schedules should be read as a claim of exemption for the entire asset . . . .” Id.
206. STEPHEN ELIAS, ALBIN RENAUER & ROBIN LEONARD, HOW TO FILE FOR CHAPTER 7
BANKRUPTCY 62 (16th ed. 2009).
207. Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668.
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owns. The debtor lists $10,000 as the market value of the stock on
Schedule C and also lists $10,000 as the value of the exemption. Six
months later, before the debtor receives his or her discharge, the company
in which the debtor owned the stock releases a revolutionary new product
that has the effect of doubling the value of the stock to $20,000. Because
the debtor only exempted a $10,000 interest in the stock, the trustee,
without objecting, can force the sale of the stock and recover the excess for
the estate. If the debtor had listed “100% of fair market value,” however,
he or she would have been able to keep the stock itself, unless the trustee
objected before the end of the thirty-day period.
Until the requirement to write “100% of FMV” or similar language is
well-known, its short-term effects could hit debtors very hard, particularly
in the homestead exemption.208 Because houses are another category of
property that changes value, debtors may encounter the same situation as
the stock example, except this time their house is being sold. In addition,
the value of the property is, many times, worth less to the debtor than the
property itself.209 If the property is sold, even if the debtor gets the full
current market value, the debtor will not be able to get a comparable
possession at the same price, nor will those possessions be as useful.210 In
Reilly’s case, if the Trustee sold all of Reilly’s equipment, it would be
practically impossible for Reilly to carry on in her trade as a caterer. This
would entirely frustrate the purpose of the tools of the trade exemption.
Therefore, debtors will be impeded in regaining their places as productive
members of society. This is of special concern, considering the large number of bankruptcy cases that are filed pro se.211
Two things must be done immediately to ensure debtors are aware of
this change. Schedule C must be immediately changed to instruct the
debtor how to exempt the property if the debtor would like to retain possession, as the debtor will likely want to do. This is of the utmost importance because, as the dissent noted, the holding of Schwab v. Reilly will
seem nonsensical to a debtor who is completing the schedule.212 Secondly,
attorneys must be careful to advise their clients on how to exempt the whole
interest in the property to mitigate any possibility that a debtor’s fresh start
will be hampered.
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V. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law has evolved from the early days of violence and
imprisonment.213 Its intent is now more humanitarian and utilitarian,
purposing to give debtors a fresh start and make them productive members
of society again.214 As part of this goal, bankruptcy law has allowed for the
discharge of debt and for exemptions of property from the estate to ensure
debtors can get back on their feet.215
In Schwab v. Reilly, the Supreme Court partially frustrated this purpose
by making it more difficult for the debtor to exempt the property itself,
rather than just a liquidated interest in that property.216 The Supreme
Court’s holding that the debtor must write “full fair market value” or a
similar phrase in the column for the value of the exemption on Schedule C
is neither intuitive from the schedule nor the modus operandi.217 Thus, if
debtors intend to exempt the property itself, they must follow the correct
procedure, or it will be possible for debtors to lose their property.218
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